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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the 
trial court's equity decision that Manivest had materially 
breached the Lease and that the Lease should be terminated. 
2. Whether Manivest materially breached the Lease by 
(i) obtaining the $4,000,000 bank loan without the Howes' 
knowledge or consent; (ii) assigning all of the retail tenant 
subleases to the bank; and (iii) seeking to cause the Howes to 
subordinate their fee interest in the property by conduct that 
constituted "less than good faith and fair dealing." 
3. Whether early termination of the Lease should be 
considered an unenforceable penalty where the tenant has 
materially defaulted under the Lease and where the parties have 
contracted that at the end of the Lease all improvements are to 
be the property of the lessor. 
4. Whether Manivest's numerous other lease violations 
as found by the trial court should have been separately analyzed 
by the Court of Appeals. 
5. Whether the Howes breached a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by refusing to sign the Acknowledgment which 
Manivest sent after the fact for the purpose of subordinating the 
Howes' interest to the unauthorized $4,000,000 loan. 
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REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc. 829 P.2d 160 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Jurisdiction is also based upon Rule 45 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, regulations or other rules except Rule 46 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
In 1960 the Howes, as landlord, leased a portion of 
their family dairy farm for the development of a shopping center. 
Pursuant to the Lease, the Howes subordinated their interest in 
their land to construction financing for improvements which the 
tenant built during the 1960's, before Manivest entered the 
picture.1 
1
 Manivest erroneously states that the original lessors' interest is held 
by a trust. The interest of John and Maxine Howe is held by John Howe as a 
trustee, and the interest of Earl and Vivian Howe is now held by their 
children. 
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In the Lease the parties agreed to reciprocal 
prohibitions against encumbrances. Except for the original 
construction financing, both the Howes and Manivest were 
prohibited from using their respective interest in the shopping 
center for financing purposes without the consent of the other. 
Lease 1H 4, 6, 14, 19. Manivest's statements incorrectly 
characterize the clear language of Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the 
Complaint and are not supported by any evidence whatsoever. 
In 1971, after the tenant constructed the original 
shopping center, the tenant asked the Howes to consent to an 
$852,000 working capital loan. Exhibit 4; Tr. 26, 1. 22 to 27, 
1. 7. The Howes declined and no loan was obtained. Tr. 27, 
1. 19-22. Shortly thereafter, Manivest succeeded to the tenant's 
interest and began to borrow money, assign the Lease, and create 
encumbrances without the Howes7 knowledge or consent. Findings 
6, 7, 19. 
In December of 1987, Manivest obtained a $4,000,000 
Valley Bank loan and recorded an assignment of the Lease, an 
assignment of the retail tenant subleases and a deed of trust 
which purported to encumber the Howes' fee interest. Findings 8, 
9; Tr. 291, 1. 1-4. The Howes knew nothing of this loan until 
several weeks later when Manivest sent the Howes what Manivest 
described as an "Acknowledgment." Findings 8, 9, 10. Without 
disclosing the nature or amount of the loan, Manivest asked the 
Howes to sign and return the Acknowledgment with their signatures 
notarized. Exhibit 8; Finding 10. The Acknowledgment would then 
have been in recordable form. 
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The Howes investigated, learned that Manivest was in 
default under the Lease, and demanded the defaults be cured. 
Findings 11, 12, 13. Manivest repeatedly ignored the Howes' 
demands so the Howes terminated the Lease. Finding 14. Manivest 
continued to ignore the defaults and finally threatened to sue 
the Howes; therefore, the Howes filed the Complaint. Exhibit 32; 
R. 2. Manivest counterclaimed and sought punitive damages for 
the Howes' refusal to consent to the $4,000,000 loan R. 70. 
The trial court, after hearing the testimony and after 
carefully examining the loan documents, found that the 
Acknowledgment was intended to subordinate the Howes to the 
$4,000,000 loan. Finding 10. The Court of Appeals agreed. 
Opinion, 2. Thus, both courts rejected Manivest's argument that 
the "trust deed was never intended to encumber the Howes' fee 
interest." Petition, 6.2 
The trial court found that Manivest's request for the 
Acknowledgment "in the form proposed constituted something less 
than good faith and fair dealing." Finding 10. By contrast, 
Manivest "provided no credible evidence" that the Howes breached 
their duty of good faith. Findings 29, 30. (Emphasis added.) 
Several months after the Howes terminated the Lease, 
Manivest eventually removed some of the encumbrances. At the 
time of trial, however, all of the retail tenant subleases were 
still assigned to Valley Bank. Finding 18. During the trial, 
2
 Manivest mischaracterizes the testimony found on pages 114-15 of the 
Transcript. Petition 6. Manivest's Vice President, Mr. Leeper, admitted that 
the language of the loan agreement "purports to encumber the real property." 
Tr. 291, 1. 1-4. 
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Valley Bank's Vice President testified that the bank still had a 
security interest in the rents from these retail subleases and 
that its interest was superior to that of the Howes. Tr. 145, 1. 
6-12; id. 150, 1. 15-19. Indeed, after trial, Valley Bank filed 
a Motion to Intervene in order to prevent the Howes from 
receiving these rents. R. 515. The Howes incurred considerable 
expense to defeat this claim. R. 1124-1126. 
Contrary to Manivest's contention, the Howes' Complaint 
alleged damages.3 Moreover, the trial court found considerable 
evidence that the Howes had been harmed. Finding 27. The 
unregistered underground gasoline tanks, which were over 25 years 
old, exposed the Howes to severe liabilities. Finding 24. So 
did the "numerous" health and safety violations. Findings 22, 
23.4 The encroachments exposed the Howes to the possible loss 
of property to adjacent land owners. Finding 5. The run-down 
condition of the property concerned the Howes, whose family and 
friends resided nearby. Exhibits 28, 34, 39. Because Manivest 
persistently refused to cure the defaults, the Howes were 
required to file suit at substantial expense. R. 1149. Despite 
these harms, the Howes learned through discovery near the time of 
trial that Manivest had impaired the Howes' ability to be dealt 
with fairly by assigning all of its assets to a liquidating 
3
 Complaint, M 36-38, 43-45, and 50-52. 
4
 The problems included "electrical violations, disrepair of the parking 
lot, exposed mechanical equipment, sagging roof, improperly supported gas 
line, loose debris on the roof, broken windows, water accumulation by 
electrical lines, and excess water accumulation, and exterior electrical 
outlets not waterproofed, as well as the underground storage tanks which had 
not been registered as required by law." Findings 23, 24. 
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t r u s t . Finding 20. The t r i a l court concluded tha t the 
"violat ions,* separa te ly and together , were mater ia l breaches of 
the Lease" and "of such primary importance tha t the Howes would 
not have entered in to the Lease had they been aware tha t 
[Manivest] would breach these terms." Finding 25.5 
The Complaint described the defaul ts of which the Howes 
were then aware. Later, during discovery, the Howes reviewed 
Manivest 's f i l e s and learned of numerous other de fau l t s . 6 The 
Howes repeatedly no t i f i ed Manivest tha t documents from Manivest 's 
f i l e s would be used as evidence a t t r i a l . R. 386, 804; App. No. 
6. 
The t r i a l court excluded evidence which the Howes offered 
of ce r t a in de fau l t s . The qui t claim deed, however, came in 
without objection except as to relevance (Tr. 44, 1. 2 - 8 . ) , and 
the l iqu ida t ing t r u s t agreement was admitted by s t i p u l a t i o n (Tr. 
222 . ) . Both documents came from Manivest 's own f i l e s . 
The t r i a l court considered Manivest 's arguments for a 
continuance in l i gh t of Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure. 
Given the not ice in the pleadings, the Howes' exhibi t l i s t s , the 
lack of discovery by Manivest, and the fact tha t the evidence 
5
 During the en t i re period of t h i s dispute, Manivest refused to allow the 
Howes to receive any renta l income without waiving the r ight to terminate the 
Lease. Consequently, the Howes went without any income from the shopping 
center from January of 1988 through September of 1990. Affidavit of G. 
Steenblik, Supreme Court Record on Manivest's Motion to Stay. 
6
 Just a few days before t r i a l , the Howes received access to the shopping 
center (R. 378) and to cer ta in v i t a l documents, including the assignment to 
the l iquidat ing t ru s t (Tr. 97, 1. 5-8). By inspecting the shopping center, 
the Howes became aware of the numerous health and safety v io la t ions and the 
presence of unregistered underground gasoline tanks. Findings 23, 24. 
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came from Manivest's files, the Court properly denied the 
request.7 
The Howes also alleged that Manivest had failed to 
perform maintenance and repairs and had thereby breached its 
obligation to "maintain" the shopping center. Complaint H 22. 
The trial court ruled against the Howes on this issue as a matter 
of law and excluded the Howes' evidence and expert testimony. 
Tr. 190. This was the reason for the Howes' cross-appeal. Were 
this case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, the cross-appeal 
should also be considered.8 
Manivest did not post a supersedeas bond; therefore, in 
late August of 1990 the Howes took possession of the shopping 
center. Manivest then filed a Motion for Stay with this Court. 
After briefing and argument, this Court denied that motion. 
Consequently, the Howes have been operating the shopping center, 
dealing with the tenants, negotiating new leases, and addressing 
the long-neglected health, safety and maintenance problems. 
7
 Manivest served no interrogatories asking the Howes to outline their 
evidence, and shortly before trial, Manivest cavalierly claimed that it was 
ready but that the Howes were causing delay. R. 324, 342. At trial, however, 
Manivest did an about face and argued for a continuance. Tr. 50, 1. 12-18. 
In response to Manivest's argument that it was surprised, the Howes' 
summarized for the Court of Appeals the numerous ways by which they had given 
notice of the wrongs which they intended to prove at trial. App. No. 6 
Summary of Notices. From its silence on the issue it is clear that the Court 
of Appeals was not persuaded by Manivest's surprise argument. See App. No. 5 
(Howes' Reply Brief, 3-10) . 
8
 Although the Howes sought damages for Manivest's failure to maintain the 
shopping center improvements; Manivest conveniently transferred all its assets 
to a liquidating trust. Thus the Howes' cross-appeal could only lead to a 
Pyrrhic victory. In the interest of judicial economy, the Howes agreed that 
if the Court of Appeals affirmed the lease termination, it need not decide the 
cross-appeal. 
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ISSUANCE OP A WRIT 
1. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONSISTENT 
WITH EARLIER UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 
There is no reason for this Court to review this matter 
further. This case arises from a unique factual situation in 
which the tenant, despite numerous opportunities, willfully and 
persistently refused to cure material defaults. It does not 
involve constitutional or statutory issues, and the published 
opinion does not conflict with any other opinion of the Utah 
courts. 
The holding of the Court of Appeals is succinctly stated 
on page 7 of the Opinion: 
Manivest was notified of the breach of three 
lease covenants, and had sixty days to cure 
the conditions complained of. Manivest took 
no action to cure the defaults within that 
time. The trial court, therefore, correctly 
determined that the lease terminated as a 
result of Manivest's breach. 
This holding conforms with a long line of cases where 
the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained trial courts' 
decisions to enforce the termination of leases. E.g., Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah. Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976) (this 
Court has "consistently ruled a notice of forfeiture is suffi-
cient to terminate a lease for breach of a covenant"); Jacobson 
v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954); I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet 
Installment House v. Berets. 91 P. 279 (Utah 1907). 
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Utah courts have been p a r t i c u l a r l y unsympathetic to 
tenants who have repeatedly defaulted or who have procras t ina ted 
and not taken advantage of grace per iods . Allred v. Smith. 674 
P.2d 99 (Utah 1983)(tenant made no ef for t to take advantage of 
the grace per iod) ; Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain 
Stock Exchange. 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981) (tenant repeatedly 
defaul ted) ; Russell v. Park City Utah Corp.. 548 P.2d 889 (Utah) 
c e r t , denied 429 U.S. 860 (1976) (performance not t imely) ; 
Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments. 381 P.2d 735 (Utah 1963) (af ter 
termination, tenant s t i l l fa i led to pay taxes and gave NSF 
checks); Bacon v. Park. 57 P. 28 (Utah 1899) (delay in curing 
default "was a gross v io l a t ion of the covenants of the l e a s e " ) . 
The Opinion finds fur ther support in the long-standing 
p r inc ip l e tha t in an equity case, appel la te courts do not 
"undertake an independent r e t r i a l of the factual i s sues" . 
Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 330, 340 (Utah 1980). The t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s equi table judgment to terminate a lease should be se t 
aside only where necessary to prevent manifest i n j u s t i c e . 
Ute-Cal Land Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, supra. 
See Jones v. Thorvaldson. 392 P.2d 43 (Utah 1964).9 
Manivest's au thor i t i e s can be readi ly d i s t inguished . In Abbott v. 
Goodwin. 809 P.2d 716 (Ore. App. 1991), the court se t as ide a l iquidated 
damages remedy for an employer's f a i l u r e to make contributions to a t rus t 
e s tab l i shed by a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement. I t did so because the 
l iquidated damages remedy duplicated the remedy of actual damages for audit ing 
expenses incurred. Kreger v. Hall , 425 P.2d 638 (Wash. 1967), was an act ion 
for s p e c i f i c performance of a purchase contract . The supreme court accepted 
the t r i a l court ' s f indings . In The Brower Co. v. Garrison, 468 P.2d 469 
(Wash. App. 1970), a construction contract omitted the completion date . The 
court implied a reasonable time period in order to prevent the contract from 
f a i l i n g for lack of d e f i n i t e n e s s . Weiner v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas. 389 
P.2d 803 (Kan. 1964), involved the interpretat ion of a contract for the sa le 
of o i l and gas l e a s e s . Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 812 P.2d 253 (Idaho 
1991), was a mineral l ease case in which the court analyzed the implied 
covenant to a c t i v e l y mine property so as to produce r o y a l t i e s . 
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2. MANIVEST IS SETTING UP A "STRAW MAN" OPINION 
WITH WHICH IT THINKS THIS COURT MAY TAKE ISSUE. 
Unable to find any appealable issues in the Court of 
Appeals actual opinion, Manivest constructs an imaginary opinion 
to attack. Manivest repeatedly argues about what the Court of 
Appeals "overlooked", "implicitly ruled", "apparently" 
acknowledged, or "apparently accepted", and about what Manivest 
"understands the Opinion to mean." Petition, 1, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17 
and 18. Such assumptions are not proper arguments and must be 
disregarded. 
3. THE $4,000,000 VALLEY BANK LOAN WAS 
A MATERIAL BREACH OF THE LEASE PROHIBITIONS 
AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES AND ASSIGNMENTS. 
Manivest incorrectly characterizes what the Court of 
Appeals said about the Valley Bank loan. The Court did not say 
that the recorded loan instruments were not "legally enforceable" 
and had "no legal effect." Petition, 8. The Court simply ruled 
that Manivest7s argument about legal impossibility was not a 
sufficient defense given the language of the Lease and Manivest's 
knowing attempt to subordinate the Howes' interest. 
Although Manivest attacks the Court of Appeals' reliance 
upon Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979), Manivest does 
not allege that Brewer compels an opposite result, only that 
Brewer is not strong support for the Opinion. In order to make 
The Howes also distinguished the authorities which Manivest argued to 
the Court of Appeals. App. No. 4. (Howes' Brief p. 21, 31-32). 
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this argument, however Manivest misreads both Brewer and the 
Opinion in this case. When read together, the two cases stand 
for the same proposition--a party who knowingly breaches a 
covenant and exposes another party to harm may not avoid the 
consequences by claiming that he had no legal right to do what he 
did. Equity will not condone such a result. 
In Brewer, the grantors knew that the city had created 
an encumbrance which would eventually become a problem. Here, 
Manivest intentionally created the problem with "less than good 
faith and fair dealing." Finding 10. In both cases the 
wrongdoing caused real harm.10 
Manivest's argument fails to distinguish between its 
intentionally wrongful conduct and the acts of a third party over 
whom it has no control. A party to an agreement cannot breach 
its own covenants with impunity even if its actions should later 
prove to be unenforceable. A covenant "extends to all acts of 
the covenantor himself, whether tortious or otherwise." Callon 
Institutional Royalty Investors I v. Dauphin Island Property 
Owners Ass'n, 569 S.2d 343, 345 (Ala. 1990). "The obligation he 
has assumed forbids that he should be at liberty to disquiet and 
10
 Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979) involved a deed. Thus, 
the court spoke of encumbrances against a fee interest. Its definition of 
encumbrances, however, is meant to be expansive. Bergstrom v. Moore. G17 P.2d 
1123, 1124 (Utah 1984) . Thus, in the case of a lease covenant against "all 
encumbrances of any nature whatsoever" the tenant's failure to have 
successfully encumbered the landlord's fee is not a defense. 
dis tu rb . . . by groundless act ions with no other l i a b i l i t y than 
to pay c o s t s . " Id. a t 346.n 
Although the Lease prohibi ted "a l l encumbrances of any 
nature whatsoever", Manivest knowingly created the encumbrances 
and assignments and did nothing to remove them u n t i l approxi-
mately five months a f t e r the Howes' demand -- well a f t e r the cure 
period had expired. Even then, Manivest refused to re lease the 
assignment of a l l the r e t a i l tenant subleases . Finding 18. This 
alone was a mater ia l breach which caused the Howes considerable 
addi t ional expense. R. 1124-1126.12 
Contrary to Manivest 's contention, the Court of Appeals' 
analys is i s thorough and appropr ia te . The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, c i t i ng numerous a u t h o r i t i e s and the "majority of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s " , recent ly adopted the same approach. In Merchants 
Row Corp. v. Merchants Row, I n c . , 587 N.E.2d 788 (Mass. 1992), a 
tenant under a long-term lease i n s i s t ed tha t i t could assign i t s 
lease to a bank for financing purposes. When the landlord 
11
 Manivest's re l iance upon Manlev v. Pool, 246 P.2d 386 (Okla. 1926), i s 
misplaced. There the grantee sued the grantor for breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances in a deed because a trespasser remained on the property. 
The grantor, however, undertook d i l i g e n t e f f o r t s , including a lawsuit , to 
remove the trespasser , but the grantee refused to a s s i s t and frustrated those 
e f f o r t s . 
12
 The t r i a l court found that Manivest had engaged in several transact ions 
which v i o l a t e d the prohibi t ion against assignments found in paragraph 4 of the 
Lease. Using three separate agreements for s a l e , Manivest succes s ive ly 
transferred the i n t e r e s t in the shopping center to other e n t i t i e s in order to 
obtain tax b e n e f i t s . (Finding 19; Tr. 321, 1.17-19.) Moreover, Manivest's 
assignment to a l iqu idat ing trus t was a separate breach of the prohibi t ion 
against assignments. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord Tenant § 418 (1963) . Medinah 
Temple Co. v. Currev, 44 N.E. 839, 840 (111. 1896). Based upon these c lear 
v i o l a t i o n s of Paragraph 4 of the Lease, the Howes' primary argument on appeal 
was that the assignments to Valley Bank for financing purposes v i o l a t e d 
Paragraph 6's prohibi t ion against l i e n s and encumbrances. The Howes have 
argued c o n s i s t e n t l y , however, that Paragraphs 4, 6, 14 and 19 were a 
comprehensive prohibi t ion against assignments for financing purposes. App. 
No. 4 (Howes' Brief, p . 31-39) . 
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refused to execute the assignment, the tenant sued and obtained a 
jury verdict in its favor. The Massachusetts high court 
reversed. Without limiting its decision to the specific facts of 
the case, it held that an assignment to a bank as security for a 
loan violates a lease prohibition against assignments and that a 
landlord has no obligation to act "reasonably" in withholding its 
consent. 
In Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard. 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 
(Cal. App. 1987), the California court also held that the tenant 
could not assign its interest for financing purposes where the 
lease contained a general prohibition against transfers or 
assignments. In Airport Plaza, the successor to the original 
tenant on a 75-year ground lease claimed the right to mortgage 
its leasehold interest without the owner's consent. There, as 
here, the owner had subordinated to the construction of the 
original improvements. One of the two pertinent paragraphs in 
the lease addressed financing these improvements; the other was a 
general prohibition against transfers or assignments. The tenant 
argued that its interest could be freely assigned because the 
lease did not expressly forbid leasehold financing. Id. at 201. 
The court rejected this argument. 
Manivest's argument should also be rejected because it 
put the financing in place before seeking consent. Comment (g) 
to § 15.2 of Restatement (Second) of Property states: 
[I]f a party to the lease proceeds to make a 
transfer of an interest in the leased property 
in violation of the restraint on alienation 
imposed on him without first seeking the other 
party's consent, the transfer will be in 
violation of the restraint even though the 
transferring party might be able to prove that 
the other party would have had no reasonable 
basis for objecting to the transfer. 
Id. at 104. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that regardless 
of whether the deed of trust had yet become or would be legally 
enforceable against the Howes' fee interest, Manivest breached 
the Lease.13 
4. MANIVEST'S PERSISTENT AND WILLFUL VIOLATION OF 
THE LEASE IS WELL DOCUMENTED BY ITS FAILURE TO 
CONTROL THE WEEDS WHICH WAS A MATERIAL 
BREACH OF THE LEASE. 
Manivest overstates what the Opinion says about its duty 
to maintain the shopping center. The Court did not find 
forfeiture ". . . to be "justified even if Manivest's efforts at 
weed control were reasonable." Petition, 8. (Emphasis added.) 
What the Court of Appeals found was that the weeds violated city 
ordinances, that Manivest allowed the violation to exist, and 
that Manivest took no action to cure the problem within the 
requisite time. Opinion, 7. 
The weed growth was excessive when the Howes first gave 
notice of default, yet Manivest took no action until late July, 
after the Howes terminated the Lease. Finding 16. By then, the 
weeds had been a serious fire hazard for some time. Exhibits 28, 
13
 The fallacy of Manivest's argument that it had a right to do what it 
did is belied by the language of the Acknowledgment. In it, Manivest admitted 
that the Howes' consent to the assignment for bank financing was "required" by 
the Lease. Opinion, 2. 
-14-
32. 1 4 On this basis, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized 
that the weed growth and other Lease violations were 
"substantial." Manivest's effort to claim that the Lease could 
be terminated for "a single weed left growing on the property" is 
absurd. Petition, 14. The willful persistent nature of 
Manivest's lease violations, however, is well documented by i ts 
approach to the duty to control the weeds. Thus, the Court of 
Appeals was understandably bothered by the fact that Manivest 
carelessly allowed the problem to recur during the litigation. 
Opinion, 3. In short, Manivest's argument that i ts efforts were 
reasonable lacked credibility. 
Moreover, Manivest's effort to read a "reasonableness" 
standard into this and every other obligation under a lease has 
not met with favor in the majority of jurisdictions. See 
Merchants Row Corp. v. Merchants Row, Inc., supra. 
5 . THE TERMINATION OF THE LEASE WAS APPROPRIATE. 
Although termination of the Lease may cause Manivest to 
lose the right to future rental income, such a result does not 
make for a "penalty". Termination of a lease, where contractu-
ally agreed to, has been enforced time and again. E.g. Russell 
v. Park City Utah Corp., supra (Court terminated ten year lease 
and option to purchase approximately 2,000 acres of ski resort 
14
 Exhibit 28 included photographs from March of 1988, before the Howes 
sent the not ice of defaul t ; May of 1988, before they sent the termination 
no t i ce ; June of 1988, a f ter the termination no t i ce ; and July of 1988. Tr. 85, 
1. 2-16. The t r i a l court l imited testimony with the c l a s s i c understatement 
that the photographs were "rather c lear with regard to what they depict ." Tr. 
88, 1. 10-12. After reviewing these photographs, the Murray City inspector 
t e s t i f i e d that the weeds c o n s i s t e n t l y v i o l a t e d the c i t y ordinance. Tr. 376-
379. 
land; tenant made no attempt to cure default during 45 day grace 
period). 
At trial, the Howes' expert witness, whom the trial 
court found "most credible", carefully considered the condition 
of the shopping center and the value of the remaining cash flow. 
Finding 26. He concluded that the value had dropped precipi-
tously because both expenses and vacancies had increased, rental 
income had decreased, and Manivest had neglected costly mainte-
nance which could no longer be deferred. Tr. 243, 1. 9-22; 246, 
1. 2-8. As shown in Exhibit 42, the most current data suggested 
that $500,000 to $600,000 was a generous estimate of the present 
value of the cash flow for the remainder of the Lease. Analysis 
of the five month period before the trial, suggested a negative 
value. Exhibit 42. Moreover, the $500,000 to $600,000 value 
assumed that the deterioration would be corrected, yet Manivest 
presented no credible evidence that it would reverse the decline. 
Instead, Manivest said it would not spend resources on the shop-
ping center so long as the lawsuit was pending. Tr. 3 61, 1. 7-18. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not reach its 
conclusion lightly. It thoroughly considered the issue before 
concluding that Manivest should surrender the value of the 
remaining leasehold estate. The court said: 
Taking into account that the provisions of the 
Lease are to be strictly construed against the 
parties seeking forfeiture and considering all 
of the facts and circumstances according to 
the applicable standard of proof, including, 
but not limited to, the materiality of the 
defendants' defaults, the value of the 
defendants' leasehold estate, the fair market 
value of the Property and the reasonable value 
thereof, the harm caused to the plaintiffs by 
-16-
the defendants' defaults, the willful and 
persistent nature of the defendants' defaults, 
the defendants' failure to timely respond to 
notice of default, that the Lease itself 
contemplates a forfeiture with the lessor 
succeeding to the improvements, and the 
defendants' conduct in seeking the plaintiffs' 
consent to the 1987-88 Valley Bank loan . . ., 
the value of the defendants' leasehold estate 
is not such that forfeiture is so excessive as 
to be entirely disproportionate to any loss 
that might have been contemplated. Such a 
result does not shock the conscience of the 
Court and is not unconscionable. There is no 
reason that the contractual result agreed and 
contemplated by the parties should be 
prevented from occurring. (Emphasis Added) 
Conclusion 6. The assertion by Manivest that it had so much at 
stake cannot be taken seriously when it did so little to cure the 
defaults when given the chance. 
6. AS A COURT OP EQUITY, THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS ENTITLED TO CONSIDER ALL OP THE DEFAULTS. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HOWEVER, WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO RULE ON EACH OF THEM. 
It is well settled that when a party invokes equity to 
prevent a forfeiture, it must come with clean hands. Equity does 
not protect one who has been unfair or who has failed to exercise 
reasonable diligence to perform its obligations. Willful and 
persistent defaults will not be countenanced by a court of 
equity. Thus, the trial court was required carefully to consider 
the numerous events which evidenced Manivest's conduct. When it 
did so, it came to the only logical conclusion: Manivest had 
repeatedly violated the Lease and should not ask the court to do 
what Manivest could have done for itself. 
Neither the t r i a l court nor the Court of Appeals was 
improperly influenced by the cumulative effect of Manivest 's 
conduct. The Court of Appeals cor rec t ly recognized tha t despi te 
repeated not ice and opportunity to cure, Manivest had done 
nothing to solve the "acts complained of in the Howes' March 1988 
default l e t t e r . " Opinion 3, n. 2.15 These defaul ts by 
themselves j u s t i f i e d termination of the Lease. 
7 . THE HOWES ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
Manivest erroneously argues tha t the Court of Appeals 
implied tha t a "party may withhold consent for a good reason, a 
bad reason or no reason a t a l l . " Pe t i t i on , 18. To the contrary, 
the Opinion vigorously reaffirms the implied covenant of good 
f a i t h , c i t i ng Zion's Proper t ies . Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 
1321 (Utah 1975). I t was in l i g h t of tha t covenant tha t the 
Court of Appeals considered Manivest 's troublesome conduct. 
Prince v. Elm Investment Co.. I n c . . 649 P.2d 820 (Utah 
1982) does not support Manivest 's pos i t ion . Although Elm 
Investment arose out of very d i f fe rent f ac t s , the Court 
recognized tha t a par ty may withhold consent when there i s "a 
reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n for doing so . " Id . a t 825. Certa inly , 
the contractual r igh t to withhold consent to leasehold financing, 
15
 Although the t r i a l court considered numerous a l l eged v i o l a t i o n s , in i t s 
f indings i t said that the "v io la t ions , separately and together, were material 
breaches of the Lease." Finding 25. (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals 
did not conclude that only three defaul t s "properly could be considered." 
P e t i t i o n , 17. For example, i t noted that "before rece iv ing the termination 
no t i ce , Manivest had assigned i t s i n t e r e s t in the Lease to a t r u s t , again 
unbeknownst to the Howes, to l iqu idate a l l a s s e t s including the South Lake 
Shopping Center for the benef i t of cred i tors ." Opinion, 3 . The Court a l s o 
incorporated the t r i a l court ' s f inding that "weed growth and other lease 
v i o l a t i o n s were subs tant ia l , and when taken together with the assignments and 
encumbrances, cons t i tu te a material breach of the Lease." Id. 
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as set forth in Merchants Row and Airport Plaza, was reasonable 
justification for the Howes to withhold their consent -- not to 
mention Manivest's attempt to subordinate the Howes' fee 
interest. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded 
that the Howes did not violate the duty of good faith by 
exercising their contractual right. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence demonstrated to the satisfaction of both 
the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Manivest's conduct 
was willful and persistent. Its efforts to gain advantage over 
the Howes through the 1988 Valley Bank loan were not an accident, 
and its failure to cure this and other material defaults should 
not be condoned. 
After carefully considering the evidence, the testimony 
and the equities, the trial court concluded that the agreed upon 
contractual remedy should be enforced. Thus, the Howes took over 
the operation of the shopping center. 
Manivest has given this court no reason to change that 
result. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is clearly supported by 
the prior decisions of this Court as well as other respected 
courts which have considered similar issues. Factually and 
legally, the Opinion is sound. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
decision does not call for review. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 1992. 
SNOJtf, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU JENNINGS, STROUSS & SALMON 
BykwCj- AC*J£__ By £d^.^th^StX<~. ,. 
Michael R. Carlston Gerrit M. Steenblik 
Max D. Wheeler 
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SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING CENTER 
ESTIMATED PRESENT VALUE OF LEASEHOLD 
POSSIBLE INCOME 
VACANCIES & LOST RENTS 
INCOME RECEIVED 
EXPENSES 
CASH FLOW 
REPLACEMENT COST --
BUDGET EXCEEDS ACTUAL 
ADJUSTED CASH FLOW 
PRESENT VALUE OF CASH FLOW 
CURRENT REPAIRS NEEDED 
12 YRS 
1978 - 1989 
343,000 
(54,000) 
289,000 
144,000 
145,000 
(12,000) 
133,000 
923,000 
360,000 
7 YRS 
1983 - 1989 
423,000 
(66,000) 
357,000 
163,000 
194,000 
(17,000) 
177,000 
1,228,000 
360,000 
3YRS 
1987 - 1989 
453,000 
(118,000) 
335,000 
154,000 
181,000 
(31,000) 
150,000 
1,041,000 
360,000 
1989 1 
430,000 
(108,000) 
322,000 
168,000 
154,000 
(33,000) 
121,000 
839,000 
360,000 
LAST 5 MOS. 1989 
434,000 
(165,000) 
269,000 
212,000 
57,000 
(33,000) 
24,000 
sssssssrsrxsssi 
167,000 
360,000 
ADJUSTED PRESENT VALUE 563,000 868,000 681,000 479,000 (193,000) 
APP. "2" 
788 Mass. $87 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ant to MassJLCrnzLp. 15(d), 878 
(197% is allowed. 
So OTXIGITXL 
412 Mass. 204 
jpffi. MERCHANTS BOW 
CORPORATION 
T. 
MERCHANTS ROW, INC1 
Suprane Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Suffolk. 
Argued Jan. 6, 1992. 
Beaded March 11,1992. 
Commercial tenant brought action 
against landlord, alleging that landlord 
wrongfully and nnreasonably refused to 
consent to assignment of lease. TCie Supe-
rior Court, Suftolk County, Walter E. 
Steele, X, entered judgment for tenant; and 
landlord applied for appellate review. Hie 
Supreme Judicial Court, Lynch, J,, held 
that landlord was not obligated to act rea-
sonably in withholding consent to assign-
ment of commercial lease. 
Reversed. 
Landlord and Tenant *=>76(3) 
Landlord was not obligated to act rea-
sonably in "withholding consent to assign-
ment of commercial lease that contained, 
requirement that tenant most obtain land-
lord's consent before assigning. 
Wiffiam F. Griffin, Jr., Gary S. Matsko, 
Boston, with farm, for defendant 
L Wc acknowledge the asstearx* of the 
brief fOed by the Greater Boston Real Estate 
Barbara I^Moor^RobertS-Mcfflc^ Bos-
ton* with her, for plain! jff. 
Pbifap SL Lapactm, Boston, for Greater 
Boston Real Estate Bd-, amicus curiae, snb-
nntted a brief 
Before ABRAMS, L7NCH, O'CONNOR 
and GBEANEY, JX 
LYNCH, Justice. 
The defendant, Merchants Row, IXXL, ap» 
peak from a jury verdict for the plaintiff, 
21 Merchants Row Corporation, awarding 
$8,000,000 for breach of A lease, as well as 
$150,000 for mterference with contractual 
relations, and $150,000 for violation of G.L 
e, 93A 0990 ed,). We granted the defen-
dants application for direct appellate re-
view, and we now reverse. Hie theory of 
the plaintiffs action was that the defen-
dant wrongfully and nnreasonably refused 
to consent to an assignment of the lease. 
At the dose of thcjygfeggfflfg case and 
after all the evidence, the defendant moved 
for a directed, verdict on the ground that 
the landlord has a. right, as a matter of law? 
to refnse consent to an assignment of the 
lease for any reason. The motions were 
denied, as was the defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
The following facts are undisputed. Tte 
plaintiff entered into a lease with the de-
fendant's predecessor in tttle m 1974, Ihe 
lease clause at issne in this action provides, 
in pertinent part "Notwithstanding any 
other provisions of this lease. Tenant cove-
nants and agrees that it will not assign this 
lease or sublet... the whole or any part of 
the demised premises without in each in-
stance having first received the express 
written consent of the Landlord." The 
landlord's discretion in consenting to an 
ISgnment or sublease was not expressly 
limited. The defendant acquired the prem-
ises in early 1983, Hie relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant was 
Acrimonious from its inception* 
In the summer of 1987, the plaintiff en-
tered into a purchase agreement for the 
Boanl 
Mass. 789 21 MERCHANTS ROW GOSP. •. MERCHANTS ROW 
sale of tbe plaintiffs bnsmess. The sale 1590) ("An absolute prohibition against as-
was contingent on the defendant's consent-' "signxnent and sohfettrng has tredftionalfr 
ing to an assignment of the plaintiffs aothomed a landlord to refuse permission 
lease, for any reason or no reason"), and «& at 
& April, 1S88, after much negotiation 5 7-304a *- 3, at 298 (citing Mealtkco, Inc. 
and finally, ffigatkm, the defendant con- v E & S BeaUy AssoetL, 4O0Mass. 700,511 
sented in writing to the «ss|gmne»t of the NJU2d 579 (1SS7), a "landtad may condi-
fease to the buyer; bni specific^ j » ^ ^ t fon consent in rent fncrease'Dj1 US. La-
that it was not waiving its i^hte regarding ***» Other Methods erf Acquiring Interests 
any future assignments of the 1«« **- mlka! *!•+•** »»—*-!•»--••-•• 
t i i  it  rig ts 
n a t lease. The
buyer and the plaintiff thereafter requests 
., »v_«^v w. xu^uiriii^  interests 
in Beal Estate, Essential Real Estate Prac-
tice and Procedure, MCLE D-lll—IMlS 
nS7m- A*m*f •arv^ -.T ** — 
~ j « tia uwe plaintiff thereafter request* * * *»* Procedure, MCLE D-lll—U-112 
e^tfaatthedef^daiitconseDttD^ni^fei> t1 9 7^ Aanot, "When Lessor May Withhold 
meat to the bank through which tftelioyer Consent Under Ifaqualified Provision in 
^was financing the pnrdbase Snch assign- L c 3 6 e P^rohMSng Ass%nxnent or Sublet-
Srat gave the bank tfiTahsomte ^ght to **" <* Leased Pwazrises Wi&out Lessor's 
further assfgn the lease wiifcout the land- Consent, 21 AXJL 4th 188 (1983 & Snpp. 
lord's consent The defendant objected to ^ - We see J» soimd reason to depart 
tins loss of control over its property, The f p w n i**8 *& *** *° 8™* greater pretec-
defendant icfnsed to sjgn the bank's form tkm in this regawLto commercial tenants 
of ass%nment Hie plaintiff coinmeneed ^ *** ai&*ded to residential tenants, 
v — -•*« n^«j n.iu com e ce  
this action arguing that the defendant un-
reasonably "rtithbeld its consent to the as-
signment of tfce lease 
At issue, therefore, is whether, m a com-
mercial lease, tfc i^ qnirement that the ten-
ant rnrnf *J%*-*-"**-_ *— ** ~ 
_^~„w*i iv xcajtryxmat Tenants, 
especially since we and other jmisdjctions 
see no rational distinction between resi-
dential and conunexcial leases in this re-
gard. See Sckwmo vJ BSZSbwis, 150 CaL 
A&M 883, 886 n. 3, 198 CaLBptr. 238 
(1S84); Fernandez'v. Vazquez, 897 So.2d _ ^ -_—^» www, «?w a. «>. X»B uaLttptr. a n t n u ^ o b t e l u t i ^ ^ ^ u S ^ a T S i l ^ ^ 
fbreaastgnhietJieleaaehnj)Kes,asan^ U71. U74 * 8 (BaJ^OLAwJM). 
ter of kw, anj^ ^ob^gatknj on the land- .IgftSmce the bazgaSning power of com-
lortfs part to act reasonably hi withholding merdal tenants at the lease drafting stage 
consent We conclude thai a landlord is is ortfnarily greater than that <rf residential 
not so obfigated. tmastn 1«^ «—« «.jf—-- -tenants, logic would indicate that, if we 
were to differentiate between residential 
and connnerdal leases, we would do so in 
fevor jof residential ratber tiban commercial 
tenants. As we said in Slamn, *Tt]he ques-
tion is cue of pabfie policy, which, of 
J*<kpnenZ reversed. 
n t so 
JnStexnv. Sent ControLBd. of Brooke 
Unt, 406 Mass. 458,548 NX2d 1226 0990), 
we held tbat a reasonableness requirement 
woold not beimpBed in the assignment --> i.»j-~^ *««^  
classe of a residential lease. We noted ^ fe tme rf P0*^ P 0 5 ^ whkh, of 
there that ^allinajrafcr- of fnrisdictions <OTrse» ^ Legislature is fiee to address." 
subscribe to the role that A lease provision ^ ^ ^ * &*** Control Bd qfBrookltne, 
TCQTrirlnflj^^ *vpn 406 Mass. at^ 463, 548 ISLBJSd 1226. 
"sfenmentor sublease permits the iandkird Judament ******** 
at IfcU ^ 48 JJJS^dJt226. Petitioners anl 
antneos have assumed this to be the rule in 
Massachnsetts. See ILL. Schwartz, Lease 
Drafting m Massachusetts $ 9J8 n. 1 at 
418 (1961) fTbe lessor may, of course, 
ssiKteaijfyxeftiseconseiit^ SeealsoMJS. 
Friedman, Leases $ 7.304a, at 297 (3d ed 
X W c a o t e < f a i t , w g < f i d P o t reach the issorwfretk decided lh« Hcahhco^ faOm^ to ohtam prior 
er ooeatat was* or cook! be. nnrcasonably ifitfc- %minesi oonsenr to as assignment, as the lease 
held in Bcehfca, inc. *. E * S XeaZy Assoc*. aqpnassfy Jreqniped, constltutodl « fareach of the 
400 Mass. 900.511 JM£AI 579 (1987)- T b ^ ^ e lease. M * 703-703, 511 tt£2d 579. 
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!> 
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC. -EAL ESTATE ^ \AGEV,E\T 5 •\\'!:S~V'-"-. 
January 22, 1988 
Mr. and Mrs, Gerrit M. Steenblik 
5501 East Camelhill Road 
Phoenix, Arizona 85018 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Steenblik: 
Recently, we completed a loan transaction with Valley Bank; 
and in doing so, they have taken an assignment of our leasehold 
interest at the South Lake Shopping Center. 
We are enclosing two copies of the Assignment of Lease 
which has been executed by us and by the lender. Attached to this 
assignment is an acknowledgement which we would like signed. Would 
you please sign where your names appear, have your signatures notar-
ized, and return one copy to us in the enclosed self-addressed 
envelope. 
Thank you for your help. The second copy of the assign-
ment is for your file. 
Sincerely, 
( 
Larry K\ Leeper 
Vice P>rejsident 
LKL/st 
Enclosures 
cc: John Howe 
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE 
LESSEE'S INTEREST 
In consideration of the covenants and conditions hereinafter 
contained, this Assignment is made by and between PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, 
INC., a Utah corporation ("Borrower" hereafter) and VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("Bank" hereafter), which parties agree as 
follows: 
1. Borrower, for valuable consideration in hand received, and as 
security for all indebtedness owing to Bank, does hereby sell, assign, and 
transfer unto Bank all of Borrower's right, title and interest in and to 
that certain Lease Agreement dated October 14, 1960 between Earl D. Howe, 
Vivian Howe, John 0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors, in favor of J.E. 
Lehnherr, Herman L. Franks, and Stanford L. Hale d/b/a Valley Shopping 
Center, as original Lessees, and in which Borrower is the present Lessee 
(hereinafter the "Lease11). A true and accurate copy of the Lease is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
2. The Borrower represents and warrants that Borrower is the 
present Lessee of the Lease and that the Borrower has the right to assign 
the Lease to Bank, 
3. Until default in the indebtedness owing to Bank and subject to 
Bank's right to cure Borrower's defaults in the Lease, the Borrower shall 
retain all of the obligations and duties owing to the landlords under the 
Lease. 
4. The Borrower agrees not to create or permit any additional 
liens, encumbrances, or interests to attach to the Borrower's interest in 
the Lease. Bank may pay or advance any amounts necessary to preserve and 
protect the Lease and any such payments or advances may be added to the 
indebtedness owing to Bank by Borrower. 
5. Borrower authorizes Bank to record this instrument or a notice 
of this instrument in the County in which the real property is located and 
agrees to execute a notice of assignment, trust deed, and such other 
documents as Bank deems necessary to perfect its security interest in the 
Lease. 
w. uuiiuwei ayrcei inci it w i n not amend or alter tne Lease in 
any way without the prior written consent of Bank. 
7. In the event of default, Bank shall be entitled to exercise 
its rights under this assignment and take possession of the leased premises 
and to exercise all rights held by Borrower under the Lease* 
8. This agreement shall remain in full force and effect until 
Borrower's obligations secured hereby have been paid in f u l l . 
9. This agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
parties and shall not be changed or terminated except by a written amend-
ment signed by the parties hereto. 
10. This agreement shall be governed under the laws of the State 
of Utah and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their 
successors and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto being duly authorized have 
executed the above and foregoing Assignment of Lease as of this f3 day 
of Jj^fary, 198^7 
BORROWER: 
PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST 
a Utan c o r p o r a t i o n 
INC., 
BANK: 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation," 
By:7L-
Tife: • 
s 
*=±-
C^J 
Sir iL OF "Ari ) 
s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the T
 n day of January, W 6 8 , personally appeared before 
me, , fc4^oe^£ Of , JjA tu^\a-^> , the signer of the above instrument, 
who being personally known to me or^hose identity was proved to me, duly 
acknowledged to me that he is the jJAjj^uJ^^^ of Professional 
Manivest, Inc. and executed the same (and if a corporation, the executing 
officer(s) being duly sworn acknowledged to me that he/she is the officer 
or agent of the corporation as above specified and that said instrument was 
-2-
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its 
Board of Directors and said officer or agent acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same.) 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLICi / " IJJ , 7 ^ 
Residing *\\j/kM> zU*^ ^ ^ V 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the v day of January, 1388, personally appeared before 
me, " / y ^ * * £ ' . ^ '_, "^-> 1.;-L-L 'J-*•*—- , the signer of the above instrument, 
who being personally known to me or whose identity was proved to me, duly 
acknowledged to me that he is the ', * CL, / y L ^ ^ ^ o f Valley Bank and 
Trust Company and executed the same (and if a corporation, the executing 
officer(s) being duly sworn acknowledged to me that he/she is the officer 
or agent of the corporation as above specified and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its 
Board of Directors and said officer or agent acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same.) 
^ ; / 
NOTARY PUBLIC \, ~~~1 ~~7~ 
Residing at: ^a^^aCc/U- ^ < ^ 
'J 
My Commission Expires: 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT 
ROBERT E. HOWE, BONNIE F. HOWE, WILLIAM K. EVANS, CAROL H. EVANS, 
JOHN 0. HOWE, MAXINE HOWE, GERRIT M. STEENBLIK, and JUDITH H. STEENBLIK, 
Lessors under the Lease described in the above and foregoing Assignment, 
hereby acknowledge the Assignment of Lease between Borrower and Bank and 
agree to give Bank fifteen (15) days notice of any claim or default against 
the Borrower under the above-described Lease and to allow Bank the oppor-
tunity to correct any such default within such period. 
The undersigned acknowledges that the Lessee is encumbering their 
interest in the property and said loan is hereby approved as required by 
said lease. 
The undersigned Lessors agree not to change or modify the terms of 
the above-described lease without notice to Bank. 
The Lessors acknowledge that the Lease is in full force and effect 
and the Borrower is not in default. 
Lessors acknowledge that Bank shall have no present obligation 
under the Lease and that Lessors shall look solely to Borrower for perfor-
mance, subject to Bank's right to cure any default following written 
notice. 
The foregoing Assignment and this Acknowledgement shall continue 
in full force and effect until written instructions to the contrary are 
received from Bank. All notices and demands made to the Lessors shall be 
in writing and shall be delivered personally or sent by first class mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to Lessors at the address set forth below. 
DATED as of this day of January, 1988. 
LESSORS: 
ROBERT E. HOWE 
BONNIE F. HOWE 
WILLIAM K. EVANS 
-4-
CAROL H. EVANS 
3UHO". 
MAXINE 
GERRIT 
JUDITH 
Address 
Valley 
. HOWE 
HOWE 
M. STEENBLIK 
H. STEENBLIK 
; for notice purposes: 
Bank and Trust 
80 Vest Broadway f/330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, ROBERT E. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
); I * SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, BONNIE F. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, WILLIAM K. EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, CAROL H. EVANS, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknow-
ledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
-6-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JOHN 0. HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, MAXINE HOWE, the signer of the above instrument who duly acknowledged 
to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, 6ERRIT M. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this day of January, 1988, personally appeared before 
me, JUDITH H. STEENBLIK, the signer of the above instrument who duly 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-7- Residing at: 
NOTE THE LEASE AND OPTION AGREEMENT WAS A PART OF EXHIBIT 8 
AND IS NOT INCLUDED. IT IS INCLUDED AS ITEM NO. "H" IN 
MANIVEST'S APPENDIX. 
1746187 
w wail tJ< p^- a i J
 Rcq'ueat 0r Wo^Jh»*£* , 
Fee Paid Nellie M. JapU, f 
Recorder, Salt Lak£c<^^£^Ctah 
. By cS- /&2&*xt<V*puty 
\544 Su- fc .^c l fcl. 
Re/. AJ}±-
ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE AND OPTION 
and 
CONSENT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that we, J. E. LEHNHERR, 
HERMAN L. FRAJKS and STANFORD L. HALE, copartners, doing business 
under the firm name and style of VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER, do hereby 
ASSIGN, SELL, TRANSFER and SET OVER to SOUTH LAKE SHOPPING CENTER, 
v^  a Utah Corporation, all of our right, title and interest in and to 
that certain LEASE and OPTION executed on the 14th day of October, 
\ 
s 
w 1960, and recorded in the Office of the County Recorder in and for 
K Salt Lake County, Stat*- of Utah, on the ->< day of Q^cXiXu^ 
1960, as entry number 1724.5JS* . the said LEASE and OPTION 
referring to land situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and being more particularly described as follows, towit: 
Commencing at a point 52 rods West and 14 rods North 
from the Southe?st corner of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence North 66 rods, more or 
less, to the North line of the South half of said 
Northwest quarter; thence West along said North line 
953 feet, more or less, to the Northeast corner of 
premises described in deed recorded as Entry No. 326068, 
Official Records; thence South 1° 02' West 387,6 feet, 
more or less, to the Southeast corner of said premises; 
thence West along the Southerly boundary of said 
premises 226 feet, more or less, to the Southwest 
corner thereof, thence onward West 321.75 feet, more 
or less, to the Northwesterly corner of a parcel of 
land described in deed recorded as Entry No. 165237, 
Official Records; thence following the exterior 
boundaries of a parcel of land described in said deed 
South 19 rods; thence South 27° 45' East 32.7 rods; 
thence South 50° 05! East 11.2 rods; thence South 4.5 
rods, more or less, to the South line of said Northwest 
quarter;thence East along the South line of said 
Northwest quarter to a point on the Northerly line of 
Vine Street; thence North 46° 43' 30" East 71.5 feet; 
.Thence East 189 feet; thence South 300 feet to the 
center of Vine Street; thence South 51° 24' East along 
the center of Vine Street to a point 4.5 chains West 
and South 2° East from the Northeast corner ofthe 
Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of said 
Section 17; thence North 2° West to a point on the 
South line of said Northwest quarter; thence North 
14 rods; thence East 46.3 rods, more or less, to 
t EW1757 F«£ii4 
J*. 
the point of beginning, with 25 shares of the capital 
•tock of the G. W. R. H. Irrigation Company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hands this 
~ day of ^liey^^J.^^^, I960. 
VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER 
(a copartnership) 
by. 
Z< E. LEHSKERR - a partnez 
by. 
HERMAN L. FRANKS - a partner 
STANFOp L. HALE - a partner 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
) 
) ss« 
On this / — day of _, 1960/ personally appear 
before me J, E. LEHNHERH, HERMAN L. FRANKS and STANFORD L. HALE, 
who, being first duly sworn, acknowledged to me that they executed 
the foregoing Assignment of Lease 
i 
s 
a Option. l 
Ncjtary P u b l i c / 
liding at ^ C ^ /JJJPTJ'LL 
My Commission Expires: 
CONSENT 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that we, EARL E. HOWE 
and VIVIAN HOWE, his wife, and JOHN 0. HOWE and MAXINE HOWE, his 
wife, do hereby consent and ratify the foregoing assignment, provided 
however that neither such assignment nor acceptance of rent from 
the assignee shall relieve or release the assignors from its obliga-
tions under the terms and provisions of the said lease, and on 
further condition that the assignee shall perform to the undersigned 
BH1757 K:I115 
as landlord the terms, covenants, and conditions of the lease 
on the part of the tenant to be performed. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have hereunto set our hands this 
Z -~ day of *5ftfH*w&x^ I960. 
*/,< (f WfotfJ 
EARL E. HOWE 
VIVIAN/TiOWE 
y^ftfcl 0 . HOWE " '' '"''' 
MAXlte HOWE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 88. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this 3**^day of y7s*JU%*AAA~ , 1960, personally appeared 
before me EARL E. HOWE, VIVIAN HOWE, JOHN 0. HOWE and KAXINE HOWE, 
who, being first duly sworn, acknowledged to me that they executed 
the foregoing Consent. 
on Expires: 
y ^ % , \ .•• Residing at 
VVjWy Commissi
f 
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PROFESSIONAL r.WJIVEST, INC. RfAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT a\ II JVESTMgfs 
September U t 1973 
REGISTERED - RETURN 
RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Messrs. John and Enr l Howe 
942 East 5000 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
Gentlemen: 
Thi3 Is to advise you that under the teims of your agreement vith 
South Lake Shopping Center dated October 14, 19C0, we hereby elect 
to exercise the option lo purchase 9.339 acres os described on the 
attached survey. We vould like to close the purchase on September 24 
at the office? of Ccnr.onv.cu 1th Land iitie Company (fcrrexly Caidon 
Abstract Company). 
According to ny computations, the sales price will be $118,530.59. I 
arrived at that figure in the follov/mg manner. Under the teirs of, 
your agreemert of sale on September 25, 1970 (copy enclosed), the sales 
priccvas $12,392.00 per acre. Since that time, there ha« been a $100 
Increase in October of 1970, October of 1971 and October of 1972, vhich 
means that our cost today is $12,692.00. 
Following the agreement in 1970, Paragraph 4, ve will have purchased 
9.339 acres multiplied by S11.891.9S which equals $111,059.29, which 
•leave a balance for payoff of $177,297.91. 
The $111,059.29 represents a 397. reduction in the amount due; or stated 
In another way, a 39% reduction in the remaining ground which, according 
to my computations, will reduce our ground rental by 397. of the present 
rent, $19,177.42 per year making the new rental $11,791.34 or $932.61 
per month. " * — 
At you vlll notice on the attached plat, the purchaser of this property 
has requested the right-of-way as illustrated. We vould appreciate 
your granting this right-of-way as a part of the sale. If, however, 
this la not satisfactory, vo also elect to purchase that atrip. 
Ve are, frankly, selling this ground In order to reduce the cash losses 
vhich ve are incurring. Our sales price will net us about $10,000 
after expenses, but it vlll reduce our ground rent* 
1505 UNtVXnSiTY CLUD BUILDING • SALT LAKE OTY U U H 6-Jl'l • (801) 320-S753 
Mensro. John and Karl Hove 
September 14, 1973 
Pace 2 
The term of our sale It cash at closing at 1:30 on September the ?4th. 
If you vould prefer to receive this money over a period of time, we 
would be happy to work out some kind of security agreement which 
should be satisfactory to you to make it an installment sale. 
If you have any questions, please call me. If not, would you let me 
knov; in time to have a deed prepared for closing. 
Sincerely, 
Frank L. Fister 
FGF/nh 
Enclosures 
cc J)* Kowe Moffat 
Mcftrn. John and Carl Howe 
September 14, 1973 
Pace 2 
The term of our sale is cash at closing at 1:30 on September the 24Lh. 
If you vould prefer to receive this money over a period of time, vc 
vould be happy to work out some kind of security agreement which 
should be satisfactory to you to make il an installment sale. 
If you have any questions, please call me. If not, would you let me 
know in time to have a deed prepared for closing. 
Sincerely, 
Frank G. Fister 
FGF/nh 
Enclosures 
cc Dec Howe Moffat 
^ ...„*.„...-.....-,V/n •*-*-«- '.— ••• r»;.-.--(y — -«K-
/ ^ .o.*. •• >»j- „< <o ,~ '. * / / , .- / / . ; / / . v / V 
rf * V ^ y . r •%••***»f .*•» /» •;r*n<»* • • 
:k;'> 
4 
ii 
* 
' 
' 
• • 
!' *S6T%*S'n' S2.' 4/ 
V. .•»,*, ^ , / • ^wf.m¥t.9t^ 
»
 < 
• • • cs*/r**/*s 
• 
\ * • • 
• 
. -
F. 
, 
• 
•3 
* 
^ 1 
• 
. u r 
- • 
• 
n 
*
fc
 \ 
\ 
• 
• 
' ..
 # * . 
^ CASS J 
• 
X4*. 
\ *»• 
\ ©> 
I I I, 
*SC*JJ-
/ssys/J** S + .2 
I t g U n l n g »t a point on »f»r t**\ l i f t * • ( Vine Scre t t , » a U point WtJ«t «outn 1712.21 feet 
onO* t a t t 2*4.31 ( • • ( frwo th« !Urtl>**at corner oL Section 17. TovntMp 2 S«*<h, t *n(» \ [ m i , Salt 
Lakt la« t ana* . *«r ld l jn * n j running *,!•<•«<• «t»uth 0 ' SC J5* • « • ! a l :n< »MJ ta«t l l n - 251. 1C (»«•»; 
thvoca Hovih 27* 20' t * s t along <«itf f * » t K m 2*1.49 f e n ; ttt.nc* S* r i l . i . " 10' C*»t ) K . I « f » r i ; 
IHaaca t * t t 4V5.14 f a c t ; tlu-nca l a r t n US' 5 1 ' iC" l .M( S2f. 12 f e f . ; »h-nr« Nor'h 2 i ' C3' Ve»t * ' 7 . H 
f o e t l tfcenct Marth I * ' 41* JV' 'Vat I ' * . 5 ? f r e t ; titrtic* VnwtK J* I f Vr<»l U 0 . 1 l f v « t ; tnt-nc* »*»uth 
. t f * ( U ' W«at 121.41 f « « l to l a * p o U i of • * * ( * • ( « £ , - C M I D I H f . * t )1 o t r v a . 
T«ff>tk«r wttt* iK« fatiwwtng'a'aavrlaeJ r l g h f a f ' t o j j i 
fcWgtanlng at a p«lnt *t«rth I I ' 4 1 ' 15" Vaat 11.22 fvM ttvm tK< K«rrlif.<«i r**rnrr • ( ih» •b>.*«-
#«»<r tWJ f r w t v r i f *4tU pvlni j | n w »k>ing kauth I 3 J 0 . 1 * f re t «nj £.^tt 1T7.S1 U c ( fr«»« tl.v NMriK««itt 
C*r»«r »f f f l l t M i l \ T«>vn^hlr 2 f «*»«tl». «™gw I C a t t , S.il i U k f lant +t\4 f V r U t j n ; «n<l rwnnlng Hun. t 
• t f r ln C* i C 2 ) M i.t»t P : . 0 («•« !»• ih%' i i t«tn llnw a( )4.03 >uwifi; t t i r m r Xi.rih 41* 4 1 ' j ) H . e * t * ! o . n 
• • H 4 S v « ' K l i n t 20 C f r r * ; (K.-m^ bmith C 10* 3>N - f » i 1V2.Q U r i ; lh.-«rr J .^ ih I I * 4y' }*»" U » t 20.0 
f f « t ! • 4W ft*l«l uf »«gl«MiAg. • 
, 'uv,T151973_.,i£^r-
t#«.*«M r;r:.".-sT .V- . . - • • • ••-> TITLE / 
2S75265 "• MJ^^1"^-^^1 
RELEASE OF LEASE 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Valley Shopping Center entered Into a lease agreement 
on the 14th day of October, 1960, by and between Earl E. Howe and Vivian Rove, 
his wife, and John 0. Hove and Maxine Hove, his wife, lessors, which lease 
was subsequently assigned to South Lake Shopping Center, a Utah corporation, 
successor in interest of Valley Shopping Center, lessee, and 
WHEREAS, Professional Maniveat, Inc., a Utah corporation acquired the 
stock of South Lake Shopping Center and upon disolution of that corporation 
became successor in interest in said lease, and 
WHEREAS, a portion of the ground covered by said lease has been 
conveyed to lessee by lessors, and 
WHEREAS, the lessee has conveyed the aarr.c portion of ground to 
Empire West, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and 
WHEREAS, the lessee desires to release from said lease the property 
conveyed, the parties agree: 
X. 
PROPERTY DELETED FROM LEASE: 
That certain property situated in the County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, as is described in the hereto attached Exhibit A, made a part hereof 
by reference, is hereby deleted from that certain lease agreement entered 
Into on the 14th day of October, 1960, by and between Earl E. Hove and Vivian 
Hove, and John 0. Hove and Maxine Hove, lessors, and Valley Shopping Center, 
lessee, which lease was assigned to South Lake Shopping Center. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto set their hands this 10th 
day of October, 1973. 
PROFESSIONAJ^MANIVEST, INC . 
.•"ERNEST c. PSARRAS, President 
""" '' MttJ- I 
WALTER B. COLLL1T, Secretary 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH "") 
) •• 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the /O day of D Cts-k^s « 1973, there personally 
appeared before me Ernest C. Paarras and Walter B. Collect> known to me to be 
«
 %,,*heMJPre ardent and Secretary respectively of the corporation that executed the 
.**\ ^ ive..^d''«foregoing instrument on behalf of such corporation and they 
/ y .#V^3rJ^^i>a,g€^ to me that the corporation executed such instrument pursuant 
2 . / Jv? ef t?i feyVu^ o r resolutjlon of its Board of/T5ire^tors. 
RELEASE OF LEASE 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Beginning at a point on the East line of Vine Street said point 
being South 1712.28 feet and East 296.31 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence South 0*00*35" West along 
•aid East line 258.10 feet; thence South 27*30* East along said 
East line 291.89 feet; thence North 62*30' East 137.16 feet; thence 
.) East 450.16 feet; thence North 85*51*30" East 229.12 feet; thence 
/O North 24*00* West 677.76 feet; thence North 89*49*35M West 127.52 
feet; thence South 3*19' West 180.91 feet; thence South 89*48' West 
'/" 521.41 feet to the point of beginning. 
•V Beginning at a point North 89*49*35" West 18.22 feet from the North-
^'^ east corner of the above described property, said point also being 
South 1530.18 feet and East 937.48 feet from the Northwest corner 
of Section 17, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Ba9e and 
Meridian; and running thence North 0*10'25" East 192.0 feet to the 
South line of 5600 South; thence North 89*49,35" Vest along said South 
line 20.0 feet; thence South 0*10'25" West 192.0 feet; thence South 
89*49*35" East 20.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
* * * 
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WARRANTY- DEED 
EARL E. HOWE and VIVIAN M. HOWE, aka VIVIAN HOWE, his 
wife, JOHN 0. HOWE and MAXINE T. HOWE, aka MAXINE HOWE, his wife, 
Grantors of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, hereby convey and 
warrant to PROFESSIONAL MANIVEST, INC, Grantee of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, for the sun of TEN DOLLARS and other good 
and valuable considerations, the following described tract of 
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit: 
Beginning at a point on the East line of Vine Street, 
•aid point being South 1712.28 feet and East 296.31 feet 
from the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 0° 00* 35" West along said East line 258.10 
> feet; thence South 27° 30' East along said East line 
^•291.89 feet; thence North 62° 30' East 137.16 feet; 
7 'thence East 450.16 feet; thence North 85° 51' 30" East 
>v229.12 feet? thence North 24° 00* West 677.76 feet; 
^thence North 89° 49' 35" West 127.52 feet; thence South 
\>)3° 19' West 180.91 feet; thence South 89° 48' West 
521.41 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with the/ following*1describe! right of way: 
Beginning at a point North 89° 491 35" West 18.22 feet 
from the Northeast corner of the above describee property, 
* said point also being South 1530.18 feet and East 937.48 
»S^  feet from the Northwest corner of Section 17, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
*"* running thence North 0° 10' 25M East 192.0 feet to the 
„ South line of 5600 South; thence North 89° 49* 35" West 
^ along said South line 20.0 feet;thence Southc^lO* 25" 
West 192.0 feet; thence South 89° 49• 35" East 20.0 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
WITNESS THE HANDS of the Grantors, this j.rz day of October, 
1973. 
Earl £• Howe 
74 tor-?A 
Vivian M. Howe 
Howe 
fraxme T. Howe * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) S S 
0 n
 the Q r/i day of October, 1973, personally appeared 
before me EARL E. HOWE, VIVIAN M. HOWE, aka VIVIAN HOWE, his wife,! O 
LAW O f ICC* OF 
MOFFAT, WCLLINO PAUUtCN 6r BUMNINOMAM 
A 9#o'«*«'OMAi. ceRP0D«Tio« 
f T M PkOOM 1 * i » V f t t •UIV.O»N0 
•ALT LAKICtTV. UTAH • 4111 
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JOHN O. HOWE and MAXINE T. HOWE, aka MAXINE HOWE, his wife, the 
signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that they executed the same. 
I 'A< ^Affi^ H My Commission exp: 
~^V, ,. // V. ^ 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
t ires: 
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(Ex. 30, 31.) Moreover, all of the defaults persisted long after 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure, despite the fact 
that the Lease made time "of the essence." (Ex. 1, 11 23. )22 
Finally, if they were "no big deal" as Manivest contends, why 
didn't Manivest just take care of them? It had ample opportunity 
to do so. 
Facts Regarding the Counterclaim. 
When asked whether the Howes were required to sign the 
Acknowledgement, Mr. Baldwin testified point blank: "In my 
opinion, they did not." (Tr. 148, 1. 5-6.) Baldwin also 
A "time of the essence" provision gives a minor breach as to 
timely performance the legal effect of a material breach. See Corbin on 
Contracts § 718, Vol. 3, p. 797 (1963) (Supp. 1991); Zancanaro v. Cross, 339 
P.2d 746 (Ariz. 1959). 
Manivest authorities can be distinguished. Moon Lake Electrical 
Association v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1966), was a bonding case sub}ect to the particular requirements of bid 
bonds. First Security Bank cf Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 
1963) and Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952), involve the forfeiture 
of a purchaser's rights under installment real estate contract. Our courts 
have constructed very specific rules for these situations. Moreover, the 
Maxwel1 court denied forfeiture because there was confusion as to the time 
period within which the performance was required. The notice given to the 
delinquent buyer was indefinite or uncertain as to the performance demanded. 
Id. at 1081. The court held that the buyer was entitled to rely upon the 30-
day notice it received from the title company and tendered its performance 
well within that time period. Polyglycoat v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1979), arose out of an alleged violation of an exclusive marketing contract. 
There is nothing to suggest that the remedies were agreed to by the parties; 
therefore, under the U.C.C. and common law the court determined on what basis 
to allow "rescission." In Harar Realty Corp. v. Michlin & Hill, Inc., 449 
N.Y.S.2d 213 (N.Y. 1982), the lease required the owner's consent to 
improvements only if the cost exceeded $5,000. At trial, the court found that 
they cost only $3,500. Finally, unlike the tenant in Southern Hotel Company 
v. Miscott, 337 N.E.2d 660 (Ohio App. 1975), Manivest did not attempt to cure 
its default immediately upon receiving notice thereof, and there was no 
credible evidence that the Howes engaged in unfair dealing or attempted to 
take advantage of Manivest. Findings 29-30. In Southern Hotel there had been 
a long history of delinquencies until a new owner took over and attempted to 
"set up" the tenant by not giving fair notice of its intent to terminate. 
Moreover, the alleged default was immediately cured. 
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c o n s i d e r a t i o n of "the covenants and agreements here inaf ter 
mentioned to be kept, paid and performed." The p a r t i e s thereby 
agreed that a l l of the ob l iga t ions thereaf ter mentioned were 
"covenants and agreements/ ' including the o b l i g a t i o n that the 
Lease "shall be unass ignable ," 
Manives t ' s s e c r e t i v e transfers are not j u s t i f i e d by the 
cases upon which Manivest r e l i e s . 3 2 In Kendall v . Ernest 
Pes tana , I n c . , 709 P.2d 835 (Cal . 1985) , the tenants sought the 
l a n d l o r d ' s consent before a s s i g n i n g the Lease. Where the 
oppos i t e o c c u r s , i t appears the Lease may be terminated. 
Heal thco , Inc . v. E&S Real ty A s s o c i a t i o n , 400 Mass. 700, 511 
N.E.2d 579 (1987) . 
Man ives t ' s r e l i a n c e upon Pr ince v. Elm Inves tments Co. / 649 
P.2d 820 (Utah 1982) i s misp laced . In P r i n c e , t h e i s s u e was 
whether the t e n a n t ' s r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l took e f f e c t when the 
l and lo rd t r a n s f e r r e d i t s i n t e r e s t t o a p a r t n e r s h i p in which t h e 
l and lo rd had a ma jo r i ty i n t e r e s t but not complete c o n t r o l . The 
cour t cons ide red the e lements necessa ry t o c r e a t e a " s a l e " for 
purposes of invoking a n r i g h t of f i r s t r e f u s a l . " Manivest claims 
In Campbell v. Westdahl, 725 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) The 
landlord — a successor to the or ig ina l owner — bla tant ly withheld consent t o 
transfer the l ease in order to charge addit ional rent for outdoor areas 
despi te the fact that the or ig ina l landlord had agreed not t o do s o . 
Furthermore, the tenant provided the landlord with relevant f inancia l data 
about the proposed assignment. The Campbell court noted that an owner i s 
under no duty t o seek out information concerning the proposed assignment, and 
in the absence of such information M is j u s t i f i e d in withholding consent ." Id. 
at 293. F ina l ly , in Campbell the lease assignment was express ly "contingent 
upon the l e s s o r ' s consent and [became] e f f e c t i v e upon rece ipt in writ ing of 
the l e s s o r ' s consent ." Id. at 296. This avoided the rule referred to in 
Comment (g) to Restatement S 15 .2 . Prest in v. Mobil Oil Corp., 741 F.2d 268 
(9th Cir. 1964) merely stands for the proposit ion that the l e s sor must act 
reasonably and in good f a i t h . The Howes did. Finding 29, 30. 
without any documentary evidence such as partnership agreements 
that although these transfers introduced strangers to the Lease, 
the strangers did not have substantial control over the leased 
property so the transfer is not a sale. Manivest has submitted 
no authority for that proposition. The Howes respectfully submit 
that a transfer for value of a significant interest to a stranger 
violates the prohibition against assignments particularly where, 
as here, the stranger thereby gained a substantial economic 
benefit. 
c. The Claims Made by Manivest are Specious and Self-
Serving . 
This lawsuit is not about rent. It is about fairness and 
observance of agreements. In a desperate attempt to divert 
attention from its inequitable conduct, Manivest repeatedly 
claims this is a "strike suit" by the Howes to get more rent. 
Certainly, Manivest's duplicity in leveraging the Lease for 
external capital purposes does not support this claim. Its 
position is not supported by either Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco, 
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980) or Ted R. Brown and Associates, 
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964 (Ut. App. Ct. 1988). In each 
of these cases, the court ruled against the party that asserted 
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith. 
A duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested 
with a clear right is obligated to exercise that right 
to its own detriment for the purpose of benefiting 
another party to the contract. 
Rio Algom, supra, at 505. (Emphasis added.) 
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IV. 
MANIVEST'S LOAN TRANSACTIONS VIOLATED THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES. 
Unlike an assignment which involves a transfer to a third 
person of an entire estate, an encumbrance is any right which is 
created in favor of a third person and which is a burden or 
limitation on the estate. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. 
Corp,, 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The term "encumbrance" has been broadly defined. Berqstrom 
v. Koore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). Berqstrom noted, in 
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (warranties in warranty 
deeds) that where fee title is conveyed an encumbrance is "any 
right that a third person holds which constitutes a burden or 
2 imitation upon the rights of the fee titleholder." Id. This 
definition is meant to be expansive, and includes "mortgages, tax 
liens, labor and materialmen's liens" as well as easements and 
other servitudes. 
Further, an assignment of a lease for security purposes is a 
mortgage of a lease. E.g., Slane v. Polar Oil Co., 41 P.2d 490 
(Wyo. 1935); Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 318 P.2d 359 (Ariz. 
1957).J" it is, therefore, axiomatic that a landlord may forbid 
the tenant from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering the leasehold 
estate. 
21 
An encumbrance may attach to either a leasehold interest, a fee 
interest, or both. Under Utah law, all rights or estates in land, including a 
leasehold estate, may be mortgaged. See Utah Code Ann. 5 57-1-1 et seq.; see 
also Bybee v. Stuart, 169 P.2d 216 (Utah 1948). 
It is clear that the Lease prohibited all the Manivest 
encumbrances. Paragraph 14 of the Lease for example addressed 
encumbrances for the construction of the original improvements. 
This paragraph protected the Howes from personal liability on 
construction loans and prohibited speculative borrowings. It 
required that any improvements be constructed for immediate 
occupancy, pursuant to a signed sublease. Upon these conditions, 
construction loans for the original improvements could encumber 
the interests of both the tenant and the Howes. During the 
1960*5, the parties created several such loans. (Ex. 3.) 
Paragraph 14, however, did not address all financing issues. 
For example, it did not discuss either the Howes* ability to 
borrow against their own reversionary interest, nor did it 
address any of the other encumbrances which a tenant could 
create, either through acts or omissions. 
The parties treated these issues in paragraphs 19 and 6. In 
paragraph 19, the Howes agreed not to mortgage their reversionary 
interest or otherwise encumber the "title to the property." As 
the quid pro quo, in paragraph 6 the tenant agreed that except 
for the construction loans permitted by paragraph 14, it would 
"keep the demised premises free and clear of all liens or 
encumbrances of any nature whatsoever." (Emphasis added.) 
Despite the breadth of this language, Manivest asserts that 
j4In its Brief, Manivest repeatedly fails to correctly quote paragraph 6 
of the Lease. In an apparent effort to narrowly interpret this broad 
provision, Manivest first leaves out the words "of any nature whatsoever" 
(O.B. 13) and next leaves out the word "all." (O.B. 29.) 
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the Lease only prohibited it from encumbrancing the Howes' inter-
est in the land. But in construing the Lease, an interpretation 
must be adopted, if possible, to give effect to every clause. 
Thomas J. Peck & Sons v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P.2d 446 
(Utah 1973). The interpretation urged by Manivest makes the 
covenant in paragraph 6 illusory. 
"Demised premises" as used in paragraph 6 cannot mean merely 
the Howes1 fee interest in the land. Paragraph 14 required the 
Howes to subordinate not the "demised premises," but to sub-
ordinate their "interest in the land." Moreover, unless an owner 
agrees to subordinate, a tenant has no right to encumber the 
owner's fee interest. Therefore, if the words "demised premises" 
in paragraph 6 meant only the Howes1 fee interest, paragraph 6 
would have been completely unnecessary and meaningless. Para-
graph 14 and the legal principle that a tenant cannot encumber 
the owner's fee interest without the owner's consent would have 
completely protected the Howes from the tenant's financing 
activities. 
Further support is found in paragraph 4, which grants 
permission to sublease, but expressly forbids the tenant from 
binding the "fee interest of the [Howes]." These words are not 
found in Paragraph 6. The term "demised premises" as used in 
paragraph 6 plainly means any interest or real property right, 
including Manivest's leasehold estate. In the broadest of terms, 
paragraph 6 prohibits "all liens and encumbrances of any nature 
whatsoever." 
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Paragraph 6 played an important role. It not only protected 
$ 
the Howes' reversionary estate, but also meant that a financially 
responsible tenant would remain in possession. The Lease thus 
left no room for a bank to "worm" its way into the deal to claim 
the rental income from the subleases. The Lease prohibited 
Manivest from mortgaging its leasehold and thereby impeding the 
Howes1 contractual right to collect rents in the event that 
Manivest vacated the Property or was removed therefrom. (Ex. 1, 
H 10.)35 
Read separa te ly , read in the context of appl icable rea l 
e s t a t e p r i n c i p l e s , and read together , paragraphs 6, 14 and 19 can 
have only one meaning: I t was a breach of the Lease for Manivest 
to encumber any rea l e s t a t e i n t e r e s t whatsoever, without the 
Howes' knowledge and consent. All of these paragraphs were 
e s s e n t i a l . They were a comprehensive attempt to deal with a l l of 
the various financing issues which could a r i s e during the term of 
the Lease. 
The p rac t i ca l consequence of t h i s s t ruc tu re was tha t the 
p a r t i e s would be required to negot ia te if e i t he r wanted to use 
In Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960), the 
landlord success fu l ly terminated the lease and retook possess ion . Afterwards, 
when the landlord could not recover unpaid rent from the tenant , the landlord 
sued the corporation to whom the tenant had assigned i t s r ight t o rece ive 
rents from subtenants. The court held that the landlord could not enforce the 
l ease and c o l l e c t rents from the ass ignee who had taken the assignment of 
subrents as secur i ty for a debt. If anything, the Baehr case further 
i l l u s t r a t e s why the Howes had good reason to prohibit such assignments in the 
Lease. In Chapman v. Great Western Gypsum, Co., 14 P.2d 750 (Cal. 1932), the 
court only considered whether a mortgage on a lease v io la ted a prohibi t ion 
against assignments. The lease did not include any other r e s t r i c t i o n s agkmst 
encumbrances. 
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i t s r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t for financing purposes other than for the 
o r i g i n a l improvements.36 Rather than deal ing with t h i s f inancing 
problem in a straightforward way, Manivest borrowed for i t s own 
benef i t and without informing the Howes. 
Other courts have upheld t h i s concept. In Airport Plaza, 
I n c . v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Cal. App. 1987), the 
successo r t o the or ig ina l master tenant on a 75-year ground l e a s e 
claimed the r i g h t to mortgage i t s leasehold i n t e r e s t , without the 
owner ' s consen t . The owner had subordinated to the construct ion 
of the o r i g i n a l improvements. Of the two pert inent paragraphs in 
the Ai rpor t Plaza l e a s e , one addressed the "hypothecations" for 
c o n s t r u c t i n g t he o r i g i n a l improvements. The other merely s t a t e d : 
Except as o the rwise provided in t h i s l e a s e , l e s s e e 
s h a l l not t r a n s f e r or a s s ign t h i s l ease in whole or in 
p a r t , or i t s i n t e r e s t hereunder . . . without rece iv ing 
t he p r i o r w r i t t e n consent of l e s s o r . 
Id . a t 201 . The t e n a n t argued that because the Lease did not 
e x p r e s s l y forb id l ea seho ld f inanc ing a f t er completion of the 
improvements, hypo theca t ion of the t enant ' s leasehold i n t e r e s t 
must be f ree ly permitted. Id. 
These paragraphs recognized the inherent uncer ta in t i e s of a long-
term lease which did not otherwise address potent ia l changes in economic 
circumstances. For example, there were no percentage rents and no cost of 
l i v ing adjustments. Ex. 1. Consequently, at the time of t r i a l the t o t a l 
amount that would have been payable as rent was not $24,000 per year as 
a l leged by Manivest, but approximately $12,000 per year. (R. 701) . This was 
the bas i s for the Howe's a l l e g a t i o n s in Paragraph 17 and 16 of the Complaint. 
(R. 2 . ) See Airport Plaza, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Cal. App. 
1957). This case i s not l i k e Bonanza, Inc. v. McLean, 747 P.2d 792 (Kan. 
1987) where the tenant sought financing only to construct addit ional improve-
ments. The l e s sor c l e a r l y had agreed to subordinate for t h i s purpose. The 
court had no trouble finding that the t enant ' s financing was "for the purpose 
of carrying out the or ig inal intent ion of the p a r t i e s . " Id. at 796. In 
Bonanza there was no reference to any other prohibit ion in the l e a s e against 
e i ther assignments or encumbrances. 
The court rejected this argument and ruled that the prohibi-
tion against a transfer of an interest under the lease applied to 
leasehold financing. The language in the Airport Plaza lease is 
no more comprehensive than the language of paragraphs 4, 6, 14 
and 19 of the Howes1 Lease. 
The evidence is undisputed that Manivest created the follow-
ing encumbrances on property interests associated with the Lease: 
1. The 1978 First Security Loan for $1,000,000, 
evidenced by both a Trust Deed and an Assignment of 
Rents and Leases. (Ex. 11.) 
2. The 1982 Valley Bank loan for $488,000 
evidenced by an Assignment of the Lease and all the 
subleases. (Ex. 13 & 14.) 
3. The 1987-88 Valley Bank loan for $4,000,000, 
evidenced by a Deed of Trust (with all encompassing 
lien language) and an Assignment of the Lease, both of 
which were recorded, an Assignment of all the 
subleases, as well as a recorded UCC-1 Financing 
Statement. (Ex. 17.) 
All of these occurred without the Howes' knowledge or consent and 
were prohibited by the Lease. 
Moreover, Manivest repeatedly attempted to do more than 
merely encumber its leasehold interest. Pursuant to the Lease, 
the Howes, not some third party bank, were expressly entitled to 
the sublease income in the event that Manivest abandoned or 
vacated the property or was removed therefrom. (Ex. 1, U 10.) 
Yet, at trial, the bank's counsel testified repeatedly that the 
bank claimed those rents. (E.g. Tr. 250, 1. 15-19.) Indeed, 
after the trial, the bank attempted to intervene in order to 
enforce that claim. (R. 515.) 
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Finally, Manivest added insult to injury when it attempted 
first to persuade and later, intimidate the Howes into signing 
the Acknowledgement. The Acknowledgement recited that for the 
loan in question the Howes' consent "was required by the Lease." 
(Emphasis added.) This, viewed in context with the testimony at 
trial, the form of the Loan Agreement, the fact that the Trust 
Deed had already been recorded against the Property, and the fact 
that the Howes had never previously consented to loans other than 
to construct the original improvements, demonstrates convincingly 
that the $4,000,000 loan was a surreptitious attempt to encumber 
the Howes' fee interest. 
V. 
MANIVEST VIOLATED THE LEASE BY MAKING AN 
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. 
A v o l u n t a r y ass ignment of a l e a s e h o l d e s t a t e by a l e s s e e , 
for the b e n e f i t of i t s c r e d i t o r s , i s a breach of a g e n e r a l 
p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a s s i g n m e n t s . 49 Am. Jur . 2d, Landlord Tenant 
§ 418 ( 1 9 6 3 ) . 3 ' The d e f a u l t i s even c l e a r e r where t h e l e a s e a l s o 
c o n t a i n s a s p e c i f i c p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a s s i g n m e n t s f o r t h e 
b e n e f i t of c r e d i t o r s . In t h i s c a s e , paragraph 11 of t h e Lease 
In Medinah Temple Co. v. Currey, 44 N.E. 839, 840 (111. 1896), the 
court considered t h i s s p e c i f i c i s s u e . The lease contained a general prohibi -
t ion against assignments of the l ease and provided for f o r f e i t u r e i f the 
condition was broken. The l e s s e e made a general voluntary assignment for the 
benefit of his c red i tors , whereupon the landlord sought t o declare the l ease 
f o r f e i t e d . The t r i a l court ruled in favor of the tenant; however, the Supreme 
Court of I l l i n o i s reversed, s ta t ing : "We enterta in no doubt that the volun-
tary assignment, under the law of t h i s s t a t e , was a v i o l a t i o n of the condit ion 
against ass ign ing ." I_d. at 840. (Emphasis added.) 
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that the Lease was an entirely net lease, Manivest has in effect 
admitted that it had a duty under the contract to maintain the 
improvements. Any other interpretation renders illusory and 
superfluous the words: "be responsible for", "maintain", and 
"entire demised premises" as used in the Lease. Manivest's 
rebuttal is superficial and inadequate. 
I. THE HOWES GAVE MANIVEST MORE THAN ADEQUATE 
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE. 
Manivest asserts that its failure to maintain the 
improvements, including the roof and the parking lot, was "not 
the subject of any notice or opportunity to cure." Reply Brief 
at 23 (emphasis added). This is not true. Manivest ignored 
repeated notices and persistently refused to cure the defaults. 
The March 1988 letter from the Howes to Manivest -- the 
Howe's very first communication about the defaults — did not 
simply allege a general violation of paragraph 5 of the Lease. 
It specifically addressed the condition of the improvements, 
stating: "the surface of the parking lot is not and for some 
period of time has not been in good order or repair." Ex. 30. 
By the end of March 1988, the defaults had already existed 
for well over 60 days.4 Nevertheless, after becoming aware of 
4The Valley Bank loan dated from early December of 1987. 
Ex. 16, 17 and 18. The weeds had grown the prior year and been 
exposed by receding winter snow. Ex. 30. The parking lot had 
been in disrepair for several years. Ex. 25, 26 and 28. 
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the defaults, the Howe's took reasonable and responsible action. 
See Reply Brief at 9, n. 7. The Howes did not immediately send a 
notice of termination or file a lawsuit. Instead, they wrote the 
March 1988 demand letter and specifically advised Manivest of the 
problems that were then apparent. Manivest did nothing to solve 
the maintenance problems — not then, and not even prior to the 
time of trial, almost two years later. 
After the March 1988 notice, the Howes continued to insist 
that the physical condition of the improvements was at issue. In 
April of 1988, the Howes served another strongly worded letter. 
Ex. 30. At the end of May, they served the notice of termina-
tion. Ex. 31. As of late July, however, Manivest still had not 
dealt with any of the problems. Ex. 32 (Letter dated July 27, 
1988). 
Litigation followed. In November the Howes filed their 
Complaint alleging that Manivest had breached its maintenance 
obligation and that the improvements were "in need of substantial 
maintenance and repairs." R. 0002 f22. In June of 1989, 
Manivest filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in which it charac-
terized Count Two of the Howe's Complaint as dealing only with 
weeds on the property. R. 102 U4B. In their written Response, 
the Howes reaffirmed that their concerns also dealt with other 
maintenance issues. R. 210 116. 
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During discovery the Howes gave further notice to Manivest, 
Initially, the Howes did not have access to, and had not 
inspected, the interior of the buildings or the roofs. During 
discovery, the Howes attempted to obtain permission from Manivest 
and its attorneys to perform an inspection, R. 356 at f518-20; 
R. 369 flfll-6. The Howes thus continued to assert that the 
physical condition of the improvements was at issue. 
Manivest still refused either to cure the defaults or to 
cooperate, so in January of 1990, the Howes served Manivest with 
a Motion to Permit Access. At that time, the Howes reiterated 
that the condition and maintenance of the improvements were at 
issue. R. 250. Certainly this pleading gave further notice, and 
Manivest acknowledged as much by finally allowing the Howes and 
their expert witnesses to inspect the improvements. Still, 
Manivest did nothing before the trial. 
It would be quite another matter if Manivest had seized any 
of its numerous opportunities to discharge its maintenance 
obligations. Instead, it refused. Consequently, at trial, Swen 
Mortenson admitted that "major roof work needs to be done" and 
that the cost of redoing the parking lot "was approximately 
$200,000." Tr. 361, 1. 7 to 362, 1. 2.5 When asked why the 
5Mr. Hawkes would have testified that the roof had outlived 
its useful life and that the cost of repair was approximately 
$150,000. Id. at 226; Ex. 41. 
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work had not yet been accomplished, Mr. Mortenson cavalierly 
explained: 
Q. [by Mr. CarIston] Are there any major 
expenses that you anticipate with respect to 
the shopping center property? 
A. [by Mr. Mortenson] Oh yes. 
Q. Such as? 
A. Well, we had — in 1988 in our budget we had 
planned to put at least $30,000 in the 
parking lot - in 89 we were going to put 
$30,000 in the parking lot and we have been 
unable to do so because of this lawsuit. 
Q. You've been unable to do so because of this 
lawsuit? 
A. Would you put money in here if you was 
threatened to lose the center? 
Tr. 361, 1. 7-18. In other words, Manivest did not defer main-
tenance because it had not received adequate notice. Manivest 
refused to spend money on the improvements so that it could milk 
every last dollar out of the shopping center until the date of 
the trial.6 
None of the authorities upon which Manivest relies suggests 
that the Howes repeated notices were not sufficiently specific. 
For example, in Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) 
6For breach of the covenant to repair, the landlord may both 
"terminate the lease and recover damages." Restatement S 13.1. 
See Pinqree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah 1976). The court's ruling on Manivest's Motion in Limine 
kept out evidence of the amount of deferred maintenance and thus 
precluded the Howes from receiving an award of substantial 
additional damages. 
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the seller attempted to forfeit the buyer's rights under a real 
estate sales contract even though "there was no contact or 
communication between the parties", id. at 1153 (emphasis 
added). The buyer had absolutely no idea whether the seller 
intended to waive the default, enforce it, or accept delayed 
performance, id. at 1154. Moreover, before receiving any demand 
from the seller, the buyer had "made a tender of all sums due 
under the contract." id. at 1154 (emphasis added). By contrast, 
Manivest allowed two years to pass, knowing full well that the 
Howes intended to enforce their rights under the Lease. 
In Reeploeq v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), 
rev'd on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) cert, 
den. 414 U.S. 839 (1973), the trial court forfeited the buyer's 
interest under a real estate sales contract when the buyer failed 
to make payments and to keep the improvements in good repair. 
The seller gave written notice of default, but allowed the buyer 
only 30 days to cure. Within that time, the buyer tendered all 
back payments but was unable to complete the repairs. 490 P.2d 
at 446. The trial court enforced the forfeiture despite proof 
that the repairs could not have been economically performed 
within 30 days, and that they were accomplished within a 
reasonable period of time. Id. 
The Court of Appeals found that the seller's notice of 
default failed to provide a reasonable cure period within which 
the buyer could perform the repairs, id. at 447. But the seller 
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alleged that the buyer's "full" payment was insufficient because 
it did not include attorneys fees allegedly due. The Court of 
Appeals held that jL£ a buyer has otherwise tendered satisfactory 
performance, the seller can not forfeit the contract for having 
failed to receive attorneys fees. Id. 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision and 
allowed the forfeiture to stand. Although it reached this 
decision on procedural grounds,7 the Supreme Court justified its 
action by noting that the trial court "had considered the 
relative equities" and that "[w]hile that court might have given 
the [buyer] a period of grace," the trial court had correctly 
"taken into account the apparent inability of the [buyer] to 
perform her contractual obligation." 503 P.2d at 104. The Court 
also justified the result based upon the "delays caused by the 
[buyer], and the worry and expense of litigation to which the 
[seller had] been subjected." Id. Thus, the Washington Supreme 
Court disagreed with the forfeiture analysis of the Court of 
Appeals' decision upon which Manivest relies. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court decision in Reeploeg suggests that there is no 
7One panel of the Court of Appeals had previously dismissed 
the buyer's appeal for lack of prosecution. On certiorari, the 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Later, another 
panel of the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal upon certain 
conditions. The first panel then heard the appeal and reversed 
the trial court decision. The Supreme Court concluded that one 
appellate panel had no jurisdiction to overrule another, that the 
dismissal of the appeal became final when the Supreme Court 
affirmed it, and that all subsequent proceedings were void. 
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reason to set aside the forfeiture of the Lease because Manivest 
did not take advantage of its opportunity to cure. 
Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) is 
also inapplicable. There the seller under a real estate contract 
had alleged only two defaults in its notice of cancellation: the 
buyer's failure to remove certain contingencies and the buyer's 
failure to approve a new loan. At trial/ under cross 
examination, the seller conceded that the buyer had performed 
both of these obligations before the seller sent the cancellation 
notice. The seller then argued that the contract was automatic-
ally terminated on the scheduled closing date. The contract, 
however, specifically required notice and gave the buyer 13 days 
to cure the breach after the notice. Id. at 720. Thus, the 
notice itself recognized that the contract continued for an 
additional 13 days. Under these circumstances, the Halderman 
court refused to allow the mere passing of the specified closing 
date to be the basis for cancellation. The Halderman court also 
found evidence that the seller had acted in bad faith. While 
attempting to terminate the contract, the seller had "several 
remaining tasks as seller, none of which he ever made any effort 
to perform.11 Ld. at 722. Thus, the seller not only repudiated 
the contract prematurely, but impeded the buyer's ability to 
perform. 
In this case, there was no evidence that the Howes had acted 
in bad faith or impeded Manivest's ability to perform. Indeed, 
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Manivest failed to disclose the assignment to the liquidating 
trust until just a few days before the trial8 and stalled the 
Howe's efforts to perform an inspection. Manivest thus kept the 
Howes from being more specific in their demands. Moreover, 
Manivest never did tender full performance. 
Finally, Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988) held 
that "absent a contract provision to the contrary," the seller 
may signal its intention to enforce its rights by initiating 
legal action, id. at 1089. Certainly, the Howes' lawsuit was 
notice of the most unequivocal character that they intended to 
exercise their rights under the Lease. Manivestfs failure to 
have even explored the defaults alleged in the pleadings through 
timely discovery does not allow it to ignore this "most solemn 
form" of notice. See Annot. 5 ALR2d 968, 975 (1949). 
Not only did the Howes strictly comply with terms of the 
Lease, they went well beyond its requirements. Their method of 
giving notice was reasonable, repetitive, specific and far more 
generous than what was required by the Lease. There was no 
uncertainty as to their intent. In such circumstances, Utah 
courts have consistently recognized the landlord's right to 
insist upon its contractual remedies, particularly when the 
tenant has not taken advantage of a grace period. Howe's Opening 
Brief 45-46. 
Tr. 97, 1. 5-8. 
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APP. "6" 
NOTICE OF DEFAULTS 
Date Notice 
March 30, 1988 Demand Letter from Steenblik Ex. 30 
April 29, 1988 Follow-up letter from Steenblik Ex. 30 
May 31, 1988 Termination Notice from Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
Ex. 31 
July 22/26, 1988 Telephone calls re Fire Hazard Ex. 32 
July 27, 1988 Letter re Fire Hazard Ex. 32 
August 22, 1988 Letter from Snow, Christensen, Martineau 
Ex. 32 
November 18, 1988 Complaint 
January 1, 1989 Request for Admissions and Documents, and 
Interrogatories 
July 19, 1989 Response to Manivestfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
January 23, 1990 Second Request for Admissions and Documents, 
and Interrogatories 
February 5, 1990 List of Exhibits & Witnesses 
February 15, 1990 Deposition of Nathan Woolley 
(taken by Manivest) 
February 15, 1990 Deposition of William K. Evans 
(taken by Manivest) 
February 21, 1990 Deposition of Judge L. Hawks 
(taken by Manivest) 
February 22, 1990 Deposition of Robert P. Leonard 
(taken by Manivest) 
February 26, 1990 Deposition of Gerrit Steenblik 
(taken by Manivest) 
